• Contributors

  • Alastair Norcross
  • Alison Hills
  • Andrew Reisner
  • Antti Kauppinen
  • Bart Streumer
  • Brian McElwee
  • Dan Moller
  • Daniel Star
  • David Enoch
  • David Wasserman
  • Fiona Woollard
  • Frances Kamm
  • Gerald Lang
  • Gilbert Harman
  • Guy Kahane
  • Helen Frowe
  • Iwao Hirose
  • James Morauta
  • Jeff McMahan
  • John Broome
  • John Oberdiek
  • Jonas Olson
  • Joseph Raz
  • Julia Driver
  • Julian Savulescu
  • Krister Bykvist
  • Mike Otsuka
  • Neil Levy
  • Nicholas Southwood
  • Nick Shackel
  • Nir Eyal
  • Rahul Kumar
  • Rebecca Roache
  • Richard Ashcroft
  • S. Matthew Liao
  • Saul Smilansky
  • Sergio Tenenbaum
  • Shlomi Segall
  • Simon Kirchin
  • Stephen Kearns
  • Thom Brooks
  • Toby Ord
  • Tom Douglas
  • Tom Hurka
  • Ulrike Heuer
  • Wlodek Rabinowicz

• Categories

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  • Ulrike Heuer’s Posts
  • Value Theory

• Readings

  • 
    What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being
    Richard Kraut
    
  • 
    Content and Justification
    Paul A. Boghossian
    
  • 
    Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality
    Stephen Yablo
    
  • 
    Normativity
    Judith Jarvis Thomson
    
  • 
    How We Get Along
    J. David Velleman
    
  • 
    Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity
    Christine M. Korsgaard
    
  • 
    Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason
    Sergio Tenenbaum
    
  • 
    Principled Ethics: Generalism As a Regulative Ideal
    Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
    
  • 
    Reason and Prediction
    Simon Blackburn
    
  • 
    Killing in War
    Jeff McMahan
    
  • 
    Experimental Philosophy
    Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols
    
  • 
    Intention
    G. E. M. Anscombe
    
  • 
    Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought
    Michael Thompson
    
  • 
    The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
    David J. Chalmers
    
  • 
    The Constitution of Agency
    Christine M. Korsgaard
    
  • 
    Rescuing Justice and Equality
    G. A. Cohen
    
  • 
    Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality
    David Wiggins
    
  • 
    Disadvantage
    Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit
    
  • 
    Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics
    Allan Gibbard
    
  • 
    Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
    T. M. Scanlon
    
  • 
    The Philosophy of Philosophy
    Timothy Williamson
    
  • 
    A Virtue Epistemology
    Ernest Sosa
    
  • 
    Fear of Knowledge
    Paul Boghossian
    
  • 
    Morality without Foundations
    Mark Timmons
    
  • 
    Authority and Estrangement
    Richard Moran
    
  • 
    Moral Psychology, Volume 2
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
    
  • 
    Moral Psychology, Volume 1
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
    
  • 
    Moral Psychology, Volume 3
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
    
  • 
    The Reflective Life
    Valerie Tiberius
    
  • 
    Moral Literacy
    Barbara Herman
    
  • 
    Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction
    Dale Jamieson
    
  • 
    On Human Rights
    James Griffin
    
  • 
    Experiments in Ethics
    Kwame Anthony Appiah
    
  • 
    Reasons without Rationalism
    Kieran Setiya
    
  • 
    Moral Realism: A Defence
    Russ Shafer-Landau
    
  • 
    The Way We Eat
    Peter Singer and Jim Mason
    
  • 
    Metaphysical Essays
    John Hawthorne
    
  • 
    Knowledge and Practical Interests
    Jason Stanley
    
  • 
    10 Moral Paradoxes
    Saul Smilansky
    
  • 
    Normativity and the Will
    R. Jay Wallace
    
  • 
    Ethics without Principles
    Jonathan Dancy
    
  • 
    Neuroethics
    Neil Levy
    
  • 
    Ideal Code, Real World
    Brad Hooker
    
  • 
    Self to Self: Selected Essays
    J. David Velleman
    
  • 
    The Nature of Normativity
    Ralph Wedgwood
    
  • 
    Structures of Agency: Essays
    Michael E. Bratman
    
  • 
    The Second-Person Standpoint
    Stephen Darwall
    
  • 
    Ethics and the A Priori
    Michael Smith
    
  • 
    The Practice of Value
    Joseph Raz
    
  • 
    The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life
    Jeff McMahan
    
  • 
    Weighing Lives
    John Broome
    
  • 
    Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm
    F. M. Kamm
    
  • 
    Reasons and the Good
    Roger Crisp
    
• 
  This blog is licensed under a Creative Commons License.
  

JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
An International Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy
(ISSN 1740-4681)

Volume 6, Number 3 (2009)

ARTICLES

Alex Friedman, ‘Intransitive Ethics’, pp. 277-97

David Lefkowitz, ‘Partiality and Weighing Harm to Non-Combatants’, pp. 298-316

Gerald Lang, ‘Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard’, pp. 317-38

Heath White, ‘Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness’, pp. 339-64

Leo Zaibert, ‘The Paradox of Forgiveness’, pp. 365-93

REVIEW ARTICLE

Robert Stern, ‘The Autonomy of Morality and the Morality of Autonomy’, pp. 395-415

Professor David Sobel (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) gave a talk recently at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Parfit on Subjectivism.’ A copy of the paper can be found here, and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

Derek Parfit argues that all subjective accounts of normative reasons make wildly implausible claims. He rightly insists that we have reasons to get sensations that we like and to avoid agony now and in the future. Subjective accounts cannot accommodate this thought, he claims, because likings are importantly different from desires and because subjectivists are forced to give weight only to desires that the agent currently has. One might, even after informed deliberation, fail to desire now that one avoids future agony. So subjectivists cannot vindicate the obvious claim that we now have reason to avoid tomorrow’s agony.

Professor Russ Shafer-Landau has announced the program for the 6th Annual Metaethics Workshop, which will take place in Madison, WI on Sept 11-13, 2009, and which looks fantastic!

All sessions will take place in 313 Pyle Center (702 Langdon Street)

FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 11
9am - 10:15am JON TRESAN (Florida)
Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Twin Earth, and the Meta-Moral Use of Moral Words
Chair: Christian Coons (Bowling Green)

10:40am - Noon EARL CONEE (Rochester)
The Best Alternative
Chair: David Merli (Franklin & Marshall)

1:30pm - 2:45pm SARAH McGRATH (Princeton)
Moral Knowledge and Experience
Chair: Luke Robinson (SMU)

Professor Stephen Finlay (University of Southern California) gave a talk recently at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Metaethical Contextualism Defended’, which he co-wrote with Gunnar Björnsson. A copy of the paper can be found here and they would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of the talk:

Professor David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) gave a talk today at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Giving Practical Reasons.’ A copy of David’s talk can be found here and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don’t have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such reason-giving consist in? And how is it that we can do it?

The Annual H.L.A. Hart Lecture will be given this year by Professor Joseph Raz (Oxford/Columbia).

Title: Responsibility and the Negligence Standard
Date and Time: Tuesday, 26 May 2009, at 5 p.m.
Venue: Blue Boar Lecture Theatre, Christ Church, Oxford

There will also be a post-lecture discussion at 3:45pm in the Goodhart Seminar Room, University College, Oxford, on Wednesday 27 May 2009, and it will end in time for people to attend the final Locke Lecture.

The lecture is open to the public and all are very welcome.

Those who plan to attend the Aims of Belief conference might be interested in knowing about another conference in Oslo earlier that week, on June 8 and 9.

Title: The Atypical Perpetrator
Date: 8. jun. 2009 09:30 - 9. jun. 2009 15:30
Place: Auditorium 14, Domus Biblioteca Legg til i kalender
Theme: This conference is concerned with the relationships between ethics, psychiatry and criminal responsibility.

The full program and registration information can be found here:

http://www.jus.uio.no/ikrs/arrangementer/2009/2009_psychiatry_June.html

To register, please contact Per Jørgen Ystehede: p.j.ystehede@jus.uio.no

The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, will host
an international conference on the Aim of Belief on 11-13 June, 2009.

Registration is free and includes lunches and coffee. Spaces are limited. Please register by emailing your name and affiliation to t.h.w.chan@ifikk.uio.no

** by WEDNESDAY 20TH MAY**

Time and place: Jun 11, 2009 02:00 PM - Jun 13, 2009 06:00 PM, Auditorium 3, Sophus Bugge, Blindern

We are very pleased that David Enoch has joined us as a Contributor. David is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He writes mostly in moral, political, and legal philosophy. He’s now working on a book manuscript tentatively entitled “Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism”. Welcome aboard, David!

On June 3-4, the Law and Philosophy Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem will hold an international conference on extensions of justice. The conference is organized by Prof. David Heyd. Speakers and commentators include Axel Gosseries, Avner De-Shalit, Lukas Meyer, Daniel Statman, Melinda Roberts, David Enoch, Gustaf Arrhenius, Re’em Segev, David Miller, Chaim Gans, Shlomi Segall, Efrat Ram Tiktin, Joshua Cohen, Yitzhak Benbaji, Daniel Attas, and David Heyd.
You can find the conference program, and other details (and soon, we hope, also the papers) on the conference website, here.

Workshop on Self-Defence and National-Defence
Humanities Research Institute
University of Sheffield, 19th June 2009

10.00 – 10.30 – Registration and Coffee
10.30 – 11.45 – Suzanne Uniacke (Hull)
11.45 – 12.15 – Tea and Coffee
12.15 – 13.30 - Helen Frowe (Sheffield)
13.30 – 14.30 – Lunch
14.30 – 15.45 – Gerald Lang (Leeds)
15.45 – 16.15 – Tea and Coffee
16.15 – 17.30 – Gerhard Øverland (CAPPE, Melbourne)

Professor Andrew Reisner from McGill University gave a talk today at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value.’ A copy of Andrew’s talk can be found here and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

In the decade since the buck passing analysis of good (BPA) was (re)introduced by T.M. Scanlon in his book, What We Owe to Each Other, there has been a great deal of optimism about the view. This optimism is not well founded, and so I shall argue that it is time to abandon the BPA. My suggestion is not that the BPA cannot be made to work for one narrow technical reason or another. Rather, I shall argue that the is unable to deliver on its supposed advantages and that in the end it lacks plausibility as an analysis of final value.

Dr. Krister Bykvist from Oxford University gave a talk entitled ‘Objective verus Subjective Moral Oughts’ this past Monday at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar. A copy of Krister’s talk can be found here and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

It is common in normative ethics to abstract away from any epistemic shortcomings of the agent. In this highly idealized debate, virtue ethics will simply tell you to do what the virtuous person would do (or what would display the most virtuous motive), whereas Kantian ethics will tell you to do what is based on a universalizable maxim, and utilitarianism, what would maximize general happiness. But is it right to ignore the epistemic situation of the agent?

Since it might take a while till I have a version of my contribution to the Moral Philosophy Seminar that is in reasonable shape, I am posting meanwhile a link to a “companion piece” to it. The piece is called “The Vice of Procrastination” and is forthcoming in a volume on procrastination (the contributors tried really hard to refrain from making the obvious jokes) entitled The Thief of Time edited by Chrisoula Andreou and Mark White.

We haven’t been very consistent with welcoming new Contributors, but from now on, we hope to be. To kick off this new start, please give a big warm welcome to Sergio Tenenbaum! Sergio is is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is the author of Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason, Cambridge University Press, 2007, and many other articles. Recently he gave a talk at the Moral Philosophy Seminar at Oxford, and we’ll be posting a copy of that paper in due course. We are delighted to have you on board, Sergio!

Mike Ridge has asked me to post info about a workshop on practical reason in Edinburgh on 28th June, which looks very interesting. See the link below.

http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/events/PracticalReasonConf.html

An article by Alex Voorhoeve and me entitled ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument against the Priority View’ has just been published in Philosophy & Public Affairs. The article includes a link to this post ‘for remarks by Derek Parfit in reply to this article, plus the authors’ response’. Unfortunately, this exchange won’t be ready until after Parfit has finished his book On What Matters. So once you see that book for sale, watch this space for his response to our critique. See below the fold for an abstract of the article:

Stockholm June Workshop in Philosophy 2009

Metaphysics and Normativity

June 4, 9.30 - 17.00
Stockholm University, room B497

Speakers

KENT HURTIG (UPPSALA):
‘The Scope of (External) Reasons’

JENS JOHANSSON (STOCKHOLM):
‘Temporalism about Death’s Badness’

NED MARKOSIAN (WESTERN WASHINGTON):
‘Rossian Minimalism’

JONAS OLSON (STOCKHOLM):
‘Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism’

STEPHAN TORRE (OXFORD):
‘Eternalism and the Open Future’

Organizers: Jens Johansson and Jonas Olson

Attendance is free of charge, but please email the organizers if you plan to attend.

jens.johansson@philosophy.su.se
jonas.olson@philosophy.su.se

JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
An International Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy
(ISSN 1740-4681)

Volume 6, Number 2 (2009)

ARTICLES

David DeGrazia, ‘Moral Vegetarianism from a Very Broad Basis’, pp. 143-65

Martin Peterson, ‘The Mixed Solution to the Number Problem’, pp. 166-77

Tim W. Christie, ‘Natural Separateness: Why Parfit’s Reductionist Account of Persons Fails to Support Consequentialism’, pp. 178-95

M. J. Mulnix, ‘Harm, Rights, and Liberty: Towards a Non-Normative Reading of Mill’s Liberty Principle’, pp. 196-217

Lee Ward, ‘Locke on Punishment, Property and Moral Knowledge’, pp. 218-44

DISCUSSION

Center for Ethics and Metaethics, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds

30 June to 2 July
Venue: University of Leeds, Devonshire Hall
Further information:http://williamsconference.googlepages.com/home
Registration:http://williamsconference.googlepages.com/registration

Programme

Tuesday, 30 June

9:30 – 11:15 Susan Wolf (UNC, Chapel Hill): ‘“One Thought Too Many”: Love, Morality and the Ordering of Commitment’

Respondent: Brad Hooker (Reading)

15 min coffee break

11:30 – 1:15 Philip Pettit (Princeton): ‘The Inescapability of Consequentalism’

Respondent: Roger Crisp (Oxford)

Lunchbreak until 2:15

2:15 – 4 Jay Wallace (UC Berkeley): ‘Regret, Justification and Value. Reflection on Themes from “Moral Luck”’

Centre for Ethics and Metaethics and Department of Philosophy
University of Leeds
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Venue: IDEA-CETL Building (8-12 Fenton St.), Seminar Room 1

Schedule:

2:00-3:45pm
Prof Matthew Hanser (UC Santa Barbara): “Deferring to Others”

3:45-4:15pm
Coffee break

4:15-6:00pm
Dr Helen Frowe (Sheffield): “Obeying Orders”

6:00pm-
Drinks and dinner at a local restaurant

The first Annual Arizona Workshop on Normative Ethics will take place in Tucson, Arizona at the Westward Look Resort on January 7-9, 2010. Keynote speakers will be Thomas E. Hill (UNC, Chapel Hill), Holly Smith (Rutgers) and Peter Railton (Michigan).

Professor Mark Timmons invites those interested in presenting a paper at the workshop to submit a 2-3 abstract (double-spaced) by June 1, 2009. Only one submission per person please. Abstracts will be evaluated by a program committee and decisions made in early July.

Further information about the Workshop, submission of abstracts, and location can be found on the Workshop website:

UPDATE: I’ve just added a new poll for this. Do vote away. :)

A few weeks ago, a colleague and I were discussing whether when you are refereeing a paper for a journal, you should take into account the journal’s reputation, editorial policies, etc., when you are giving your verdict regarding the paper. For lack of a better term, should you be a journal-relative referee or a journal-invariant referee? To make the issue more concrete, consider the following cases:

• The Ethics Etc Poll

  In deciding whether to recommend acceptance or rejection of a paper for a journal, should one base one's decision in part on the reputation, editorial policies, etc. of the journal?

  • Yes
  • No

  View Results

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• Recent Posts

  • Journal of Moral Philosophy 6(3) (2009)
  • Sobel on Parfit on Subjectivism
  • Program for the 6th Annual Metaethics Workshop
  • Finlay on Metaethical Contextualism Defended
  • Enoch on Giving Practical Reasons
  • H.L.A. Hart Memorial Lecture in Oxford
  • Oslo Conference on the Atypical Perpetrator
  • Oslo Conference on the Aim of Belief
  • Welcome David Enoch!
  • Conference on Extensions of Justice, June 3-4, Hebrew U

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